The paper deals with some conceptual trends in the philosophy of science of the 1980‒90s, which being evolved simultaneously with the computer revolution, make room for treating it as a revolution in mathematics. The immense and widespread popularity of Thomas Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions had made a demand for overcoming this theory, at least in some aspects, just inevitable. Two of such aspects are brought into focus in this paper. Firstly, it is the shift from theoretical to instrumental revolutions (...) which are sometimes called “Galisonian revolutions” after Peter Galison. Secondly, it is the shift from local (“little”) to global (“big”) scientific revolutions now connected with the name of Ian Hacking; such global, transdisciplinary revolutions are at times called “Hacking-type revolutions”. The computer revolution provides a typical example of both global and instrumental revolutions. That change of accents in the post-Kuhnian perspective on scientific revolutions was closely correlated with the general tendency to treat science as far more pluralistic and transdisciplinary. That tendency is primarily associated with the so-called Stanford School; Peter Galison and Ian Hacking are often seen as its representatives. In particular, that new image of science gave no support to a clear-cut separation of mathematics from other sciences. Moreover, it has formed prerequisites for the recognition of material and technical revolutions in the history of mathematics. Especially, the computer revolution can be considered in the new framework as a revolution in mathematics par excellence. (shrink)

The author traces the early evolution of Rubinstein and Shpet from neo-Kantianism and phenomenology, respectively, and shows how their ideas partly converged.

The author analyzes the implications for the philosophy of mathematics of successive paradigm transitions in the general history of philosophy.

The author presents two complementary understandings of rationality. He criticizes those who deny the continuing relevance of rationality as a cultural value as well as those who attach exaggerated importance to it.

This article analyzes facts related to the development of modern communication and information technologies and cognitive sciences that call into question the traditions of European culture and philosophy in their understanding of subjectivity: the recognition of the role of consciousness in the performance of activity, the notion of the “Self” as the center of consciousness and decision-making authority, the availability of free will, the idea of human autonomy, and the existence of a private world. The author argues for the need (...) for understanding the phenomenon of consciousness, the Self, and human autonomy in light of modern scientific data, and shows that the human being is impossible without the existence of an autonomous subjective world. (shrink)

The paper deals with Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s ideas related to the so-called “historical turn” and its application to the philosophy of mathematics. In the first part the meaning of the term “postpositivism” is specified. If we lack such a specification we can hardly discuss the philosophy of science that comes “after postpositivism”. With this end in view, the metaphor of “generations” in the philosophy of science is used. It is proposed that we restrict the use of the term “post-positivism” to (...) two and only two philosophical “generations”: the one to which Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend belong, and the previous “generation” to which Wittgenstein, Polanyi, Popper and Quine (as well as the major part of logical positivists) belong. From this point of view, Bloor, Latour, Pickering, Daston and Galison belong to the “third generation” which represents the philosophy of science “after post-positivism”. The characteristic feature of post-positivism is the combination of decisive impact of logical positivism and its severe criticism. This combination inevitably makes post-positivism a transitional form in the philosophy of science. In the second part the contribution of the “big four” of post-positivist philosophers (Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Feyerabend) to the radical change in the philosophy of mathematics in the second half of the 20th century is analyzed. Primarily, they shifted philosophical interest from the logical analysis of formal systems to the historical dynamics of informal mathematics. They also reconsidered the sharp opposition between mathematics and the physical sciences. However, the transitional character of their philosophy manifests itself both in their treatment of mathematics and their way of understanding history. On the one hand, their “heritage” is ambiguous, on the other hand, it opens new perspectives. Neither Kuhn, nor Lakatos, have eliminated completely the methodological barrier positing the fundamental heterogeneity of mathematics and natural science. Neither Lakatos, nor Kuhn, adhered to the viewpoint of relentless historicism. Nevertheless, it is their work that has made these options open for today’s historians and philosophers of science, even for philosophers of mathematics. (shrink)

This paper attempts to look at the contemporary mathematical practice through the lenses of the distributed cognition approach. The ubiquitous use of personal computers and the internet as a key attribute of the digital society is interpreted here as a means to achieve a more effective distribution of the human cognitive activity. The major challenge that determines the transformation of mathematical practice is identified as ‘the problem of complexity’. The computer-assisted complete formalization of mathematical proofs as a current tendency is (...) viewed as one of the strands along which the mathematical community responds to the challenge. It is shown that this tendency gives live to the project calling to revisit and rebuild the very foundations of mathematics to secure more effective communication and thus guarantee the reliability of contemporary mathematics. (shrink)

Any complete understanding of human psychology must take into account that a brain’s actions in the world are mediated by the body it belongs to. In the process of such interaction the human being creates artificial things, structures and mechanisms, such as technology, relationships, and culture. The subjective world is not simply the interactions between neurons at different systemic levels, but the existence of mental contents, which are determined by specific features of a certain domain of reality with which a (...) cognitive agent interacts by means of her actions. It is possible to understand specific features of the subjective world with the conception of the “embodied” and “inactive” cognition. In this framework, the problems of consciousness of consciousness, free will, the possibility of “reading” another mind and constructing mental phenomena are analyzed. If cognitive studies are not used for manipulating humans, and are not means of human degradation they must take into consideration specific features of the human phenomenon: the belonging of the human being to the social world and the world of culture. The development of cognitive studies can lead humans to new levels and contribute to new interpretations of humanism. However, under certain conditions, this development can lead to the death of the human being. This paper shows that some Soviet philosophers and psychologists, during the second half of the twentieth century, anticipated the formulations and solutions of several contemporary key problems in cognitive science before these problems emerged. (shrink)

I intend to demonstrate that the usual understanding of the ideals and norms of scientific cognition, which is often considered inseparable from the very notion of science itself, arose in concrete historical conditions; furthermore, these ideals and norms were connected with a certain type of research and a certain type of culture. As we are beginning to realize, such an understanding of ideals and norms does not work in other historical and cultural situations. I also try to show that some (...) interpretations of the ideals and goals of science, as well as some ideas about the world (which were considered pre-scientific) gain new significance in the context of contemporary knowledge. (shrink)

The author shows that the conception of epistemological realism as a contemporary variant of epistemological realism continues the realism tradition and at the same time takes into account some constructivist ideas, giving them a new interpretation. Constructive realism can be a fruitful strategy in cognitive studies, as it gives a philosophical interpretation of the current popular approach in cognitive science: so called “4 E approach”: understanding cognition as embodied, enacted. embedded and extended. The problem of Illusion and Reality is analyzed (...) from the position of constructive realism. The relations between different surrounding worlds of different cognitive agents and the common real world is specially investigated in the context of the opposition between Realism and Relativism. (shrink)

Традиционный философский вопрос о том, затрагивает ли знание реальность или же является лишь конструкцией сознания, получает оригинальный ответ в концепции современного эпистемологического конструктивизма. Этот «конструктивистский реализм» принимает особенно интересную форму в теории восприятия Гибсона, для которого восприятие не является ни построенным, ни просто данным. Скорее оно выступает как результат взаимодействия: познающий субъект вычленяет в реальности то, что соответствует его действиям. Важную роль при этом играет изучение социальной и культурной обусловленности когнитивной деятельности. À la question philosophique traditionnelle de savoir si la (...) connaissance porte sur le réel ou est une simple construction de l’esprit, le constructivisme épistémologique actuel essaye de donner une réponse originale. Ce « réalisme constructiviste » prend une forme particulièrement intéressante dans la théorie de la perception de Gibson, pour qui celle-ci n’est ni construite, ni donnée mais résulte d’une interaction, le sujet connaissant « découpant » dans la réalité ce qui correspond à ses activités. L’étude du conditionnement social et culturel des activités cognitives entre aussi dans ce cadre. To the traditional philosophical question as to know whether knowledge focuses on reality or is merely a mental construct, present day epistemological constructivism tries to give an original answer. This “constructivist realism” is especially interesting in Gibson’s theory of perception, according to which it is neither built nor given but results from an interaction, the knowing subject “cutting” within reality ail that corresponds to its activities. The study of social and cultural conditioning of cognitive activities can also be integrated in this framework. (shrink)

The author considers the social consequences of "converging technologies" and also of the internet and other new social technologies.

Cet article s'efforce d'analyser la spécificité de l'évolution de la philosophie en Russie au cours du vingtième siècle et jusqu'à présent. Il met en évidence trois courants principaux qui, à partir du début du 20e siècle et pour de nombreuses décennies ultérieures, ont déterminé le paysage philosophique de la Russie : la philosophie religieuse russe du siècle d'argent, le cosmisme russe et le marxisme russe. On montre comment, dans le cadre de la philosophie russe, aussi bien avant qu'après 1917, des (...) tentatives originales ont tenté d'interpréter la rationalité de façon non classique et la manière don't elles ont influencé la logique contemporaine ainsi que d'autres sciences humaines : la psychologie, la linguistique, la théorie littéraire. L'article examine l'étouffement de la pensée philosophique à l'époque du stalinisme et la renaissance, dans la seconde moitié du siècle, de toute une série d'orientations philosophiques (la théorie de la connaissance, la logique, la philosophie et la méthodologie de la science, la philosophie de la psychologie, l'anthropologie philosophique, l'histoire de la philosophie). Des arguments sont présentés pour étayer la thèse d'un élargissement significatif de la problématique et de l'apparition de nombreuses directions philosophiques qui se développent de façon concomitante dans la philosophie russe contemporaine (postérieure à 1991). En conclusion, les auteurs évoquent l'organisation institutionnelle de la vie philosophique dans le pays. (shrink)

Cet article s'efforce d'analyser la spécificité de l'évolution de la philosophie en Russie au cours du vingtième siècle et jusqu'à présent. Il met en évidence trois courants principaux qui, à partir du début du 20e siècle et pour de nombreuses décennies ultérieures, ont déterminé le paysage philosophique de la Russie : la philosophie religieuse russe du siècle d'argent, le cosmisme russe et le marxisme russe. On montre comment, dans le cadre de la philosophie russe, aussi bien avant qu'après 1917, des (...) tentatives originales ont tenté d'interpréter la rationalité de façon non classique et la manière don't elles ont influencé la logique contemporaine ainsi que d'autres sciences humaines : la psychologie, la linguistique, la théorie littéraire. L'article examine l'étouffement de la pensée philosophique à l'époque du stalinisme et la renaissance, dans la seconde moitié du siècle, de toute une série d'orientations philosophiques (la théorie de la connaissance, la logique, la philosophie et la méthodologie de la science, la philosophie de la psychologie, l'anthropologie philosophique, l'histoire de la philosophie). Des arguments sont présentés pour étayer la thèse d'un élargissement significatif de la problématique et de l'apparition de nombreuses directions philosophiques qui se développent de façon concomitante dans la philosophie russe contemporaine (postérieure à 1991). En conclusion, les auteurs évoquent l'organisation institutionnelle de la vie philosophique dans le pays. (shrink)

This paper sketches an historical outline of philosophy in Russia from the modern era to present time. It describes the main philosophical trends that characterized the ‘Silver Age’ in pre-revolutionary Russia (Cosmism, religious philosophy and early Marxist philosophy), and draws some lines of continuity both with Marxist and pre-Marxist philosophy. It studies the internal evolution and organization of Soviet official philosophical thought, and describes the main features the philosophical Renaissance that took place in the Soviet Union in the second half (...) of the 20th century. It finally describes the main trends, authors and publication of philosophy in Russia today. (shrink)

Successfully explaining and replicating the complexity and generality of human and animal learning will require the integration of a variety of learning mechanisms. Here, we introduce a computational model which integrates associative learning (AL) and reinforcement learning (RL). We contrast the integrated model with standalone AL and RL models in three simulation studies. First, a synthetic grid‐navigation task is employed to highlight performance advantages for the integrated model in an environment where the reward structure is both diverse and dynamic. The (...) second and third simulations contrast the performances of the three models in behavioral experiments, demonstrating advantages for the integrated model in accounting for behavioral data. (shrink)

Stakeholder scholars have long explored how stakeholder relationships differ from economic transactions. We contribute to this ongoing inquiry by developing a conceptual framework of relationality in stakeholder theory that encompasses a stakeholder-theoretic extension of Williamson's contracting schema and a new typology of stakeholder relationships. Premised on understanding relationality as the need for informal human relationships beyond formal governance, our framework locates the key difference between transaction cost economics and stakeholder theory in their treatment of informal relationships. While transaction cost economics (...) perceives informal relationships to be shaped by formal governance structures and enforced by contractual safeguards, stakeholder theory is open to the possibility that some informal relationships between stakeholders may be genuinely moral and thus irreducible to formal governance and contractual safeguards. These stakeholder relationships may lead to unique economic effects described by instrumental stakeholder theory. The difference that we identified between the two literatures shows how stakeholder theory's embrace of relationality surpasses that of transaction cost economics. (shrink)

The present paper builds on the Rawlsian critique of utilitarianism in order to identify the moral implications of Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory. While Luhmann aptly discerned the pervasive problems of the precarious system–environment relations throughout the modern society, he took moral communication to be person-centered and thus ill-equipped to deal with these problems. At the same time, the Rawlsian possibility of sacrificing fundamental liberties for the sake of economic gains not only exemplifies the Luhmannian precariousness of the relations of (...) the economic system to its societal environment, but also shows this precariousness to be a moral problem. Thus, from the systems-theoretic perspective, the Rawlsian idea of justice denotes the moral dimension of the capacity of the societal environment to carry the economic system. More generally, the proposed complementarity between Rawls and Luhmann allows to see the precariousness of system–environment relations, for any type of social system, as a moral problem. Two implications follow. First, the morally problematic manifestations of the precarious system–environment relations are not limited to the Rawlsian case of the discrimination of the least advantaged groups but rather include a broad range of social costs and damaging effects of business on society and nature. Second, and related, the proposed systems-theoretic perspective explicates the moral value of sustainability of the economic as well as other social systems in their environment, societal and ecological alike. (shrink)

ExcerptVictor Zaslavsky was a living legend for my Moscow circle friends, young intellectuals who lived and studied in the Soviet Union in the early 1980s. He was already an émigré, teaching at the Memorial University of Newfoundland in St. John's, Canada. One Italian journalist managed to bring to the Soviet Union his book Il Consenso Organizzato, published in 1981 in Bologna (it was later translated into English as The Neo-Stalinist State: Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society). My university classmate (...) who read it in Italian remembered years later that this book had helped him to understand the nature of…. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the variational principles of physics, there have been relatively few attempts to consider them for a realistic framework. In addition to the old teleological question, this paper continues the recent discussion regarding the modal involvement of the principle of least action and its relations with the Humean view of the laws of nature. The reality of possible paths in the principle of least action is examined from the perspectives of the contemporary metaphysics of modality and Leibniz's (...) concept of essences or possibles striving for existence. I elaborate a modal interpretation of the principle of least action that replaces a classical representation of a system's motion along a single history in the actual modality by simultaneous motions along an infinite set of all possible histories in the possible modality. This model is based on an intuition that deep ontological connections exist between the possible paths in the principle of least action and possible quantum histories in the Feynman path integral. I interpret the action as a physical measure of the essence of every possible history. Therefore only one actual history has the highest degree of the essence and minimal action. To address the issue of necessity, I assume that the principle of least action has a general physical necessity and lies between the laws of motion with a limited physical necessity and certain laws with a metaphysical necessity. (shrink)

Sustainability is an important topic for understanding and developing our society. For scholars who want their academic contributions to have an impact, sustainability is important for our conceptual systems. Because our conceptual systems share similarities with our social systems, we may investigate their characteristics to gain insight into how both may be achieved or at least understood. Theories of the humanities as well as the social/behavioral sciences are changing very rapidly. They are fragile and few seem to have any longevity. (...) At the same time, the theoretical base does not seem to be “advancing.” They are not supporting highly effective results in the real world, so we continue to have seemingly insolvable problems such as crime, war, and poverty. This may be because academia has become inward-focused or, in Luhmann’s terminology, autonomous from the outside world. In seeking to understand how to develop more sustainable theories we found that the concept of sustainability is contested. And, in the process of comparing the sustainability of social systems to the sustainability of theories, we came to realize that neither perspective is viable. Drawing on Luhmann’s insights on the interdependence of theories and society, we came to realize that the two exist in a coevolutionary relationship. Importantly, we present an approach for measuring that evolution and suggest directions for accelerating the coevolutionary advance of society and science. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 3, Page 762-776, July 2022.

Niklas Luhmann held a skeptical view of the role of morality in the modern society. The present paper reassesses this skepticism in view of his early work showing the regime of functional differentiation to be supported by fundamental human rights. Building on this argument, the paper advocates a more positive view of morality which is shown to be related to the sustainability of social systems in their encompassing societal and natural environment. This view is warranted by the overarching Luhmannian theme (...) of the precariousness of system–environment relations. If this view is accepted, Luhmann’s work on fundamental human rights can be read as an illustration of moral problems caused by the overexpansion tendencies of the political system. This argument is shown to connect up with the ideas of Buchanan and Rawls, as well as to fit in with the Luhmannian construct of the dilemma of structure and function. (shrink)

Twenty extremal principles of the natural sciences are reformulated to the general ontological scheme. The hypothesis is substantiated that the unique role of the principle of least action is based on its probabilistic interpretation. It is shown how most of the variational principles can be reduced to the principle of maximal probability, which is based on a realistic interpretation of Feynman’s path integral method.

Sustainability is an important topic for understanding and developing our society. For scholars who want their academic contributions to have an impact, sustainability is important for our conceptual systems. Because our conceptual systems share similarities with our social systems, we may investigate their characteristics to gain insight into how both may be achieved or at least understood. Theories of the humanities as well as the social/behavioral sciences are changing very rapidly. They are fragile and few seem to have any longevity. (...) At the same time, the theoretical base does not seem to be “advancing.” They are not supporting highly effective results in the real world, so we continue to have seemingly insolvable problems such as crime, war, and poverty. This may be because academia has become inward-focused or, in Luhmann’s terminology, autonomous from the outside world. In seeking to understand how to develop more sustainable theories we found that the concept of sustainability is contested. And, in the process of comparing the sustainability of social systems to the sustainability of theories, we came to realize that neither perspective is viable. Drawing on Luhmann’s insights on the interdependence of theories and society, we came to realize that the two exist in a coevolutionary relationship. Importantly, we present an approach for measuring that evolution and suggest directions for accelerating the coevolutionary advance of society and science. (shrink)

This book synthesizes the game-theoretic modeling of decision-making processes and an ancient moral requirement, called the Golden Rule of ethics (GR). This rule states, "Behave to others as you would like them to behave to you." The GR is one of the oldest, most widespread and specific moral requirements that appear in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The book constructs and justifies mathematical models of dynamic socio-economic processes and phenomena that reveal the mechanism of the GR and are based (...) on the concept of Berge equilibrium. The GR can be naturally used for resolving or balancing conflicts, and its "altruistic character" obviously excludes wars, blood-letting, and armed clashes. The previous book of the authors, The Berge Equilibrium: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics, covers the static case of the GR. In this book, the dynamic case of the GR is investigated using the altruistic concept of Berge equilibrium and three factors as follows: a) a modification of N.N. Krasovskii's mathematical formalization of differential positional games (DPGs), in view of the counterexamples given by A.I. Subbotin and A.F. Kononenko; b) the method of guiding control, proposed by N.N. Krasovskii; c) the Germeier convolution of the payoff functions of different players. Additionally, the book features exercises, problems, and solution tips collected together in Appendix 1, as well as new approaches to conflict resolution as presented in Appendices 2-4. The book will be of use to undergraduate and graduate students and experts in the field of decision-making in complex control and management systems, as well as anyone interested in game theory and applications. (shrink)

Despite the notions of possible worlds and substances are very important subjects of contemporary metaphysics, there are relatively few attempts to combine these in a united framework. This paper considers the metaphysical model of the origins and the evolution of possible worlds that occurs from an interaction between substances. I involve Leibniz’s doctrine of the striving possibles that every possibility of substance has its own essence and tendency towards existence. It is supposed that the activities of substances are constantly aimed (...) at using this tendency in all possible ways. Only the consistent and stable interactions between the substances give birth to stable objects in one of many worlds. Thus activity of substances changes from the possible modality of being to the actual modality of being in form of existence of the worlds. I divide substance’s possibility into two aspects—dynamic (possible or virtual history) and static (possible or potential mutual state). Thanks to the summation of virtual histories, in the possible modality of being, the maximal number of virtual histories is combined into the actual history in the actual modality. (shrink)

In this article, we draw on established views of CSR dysfunctionalities to show how and why CSR is regularly observed to be both shaped by and supportive of capitalism. We proceed to show that these dysfunctionalities are maintained by both the pro- and anticapitalist approaches to CSR, both of which imply an ill-defined separation of the economy and society as well an overly strong problem or solution focus on political and economic issues. Finally, we present a post-capitalist approach to CSR (...) that overcomes (1) the ill-defined separation of the economy and society, (2) the capitalist bias towards economic rationalities, and (3) the overidentification of society with its political system; this approach thus helps to manage the abovementioned CSR dysfunctionalities. (shrink)

The framework of a simple opposition realism – anti-realism is not enough to analyze the views on the reality of unobservable objects of quantum theory. First, it is necessary to distinguish between realism in relation to the theory and realism in relation to the theory’s objects. Secondly, realism in relation to classical objects can be combined, both with realism and with anti-realism in relation to quantum objects. Third, the concept of “existence” and “to exist objectively” can have different meanings. To (...) take into account these factors, the article describes three approaches: classical realism, quantum anti-realism, and quantum realism. I show that the debate around quantum reality has intensified in recent decades due to a series of new quantum experiments. The current stage of the debate is caused by the second quantum revolution relating to the transfer and processing of quantum information. Classical realism and old versions of quantum anti-realism have become insufficiently effective to explain the results of a series of experiments. Proponents of quantum realism, in turn, refer to the possibility of using the wave function to manipulate quantum objects before their measurement. In conclusion, I assume that not only theoretical discussions but also experiments and new technologies can have a major impact on the seemingly purely philosophical debate about reality. (shrink)

In this paper we treat humorous situations as a series of events underpinned by topoi, principles of reasoning recognised within a socio-cultural community. We claim that humorous effect in jokes and other discourse is often created by the juxtaposition of topoi evoked. A prerequisite for this is that there is a shift where the interpreter of the discourse updates their information state with regard to a second topos being evoked. This view of humour is consistent with an incremental analysis of (...) dialogue, and we therefore argue that interaction is central both for humour creation and interpretation. We point out some different ways in which topoi are juxtaposed in humorous dialogues as well as in jokes published in social media or in joke books, and take jokes from the coronavirus pandemic as an example because this makes lots of new topoi available and therefore offers the opportunity of creating novel jokes based on the juxtaposition of the new and existing topoi. We explore how the mechanisms of inference in dialogue can be applied to humour through the four elements from our title: old, new, borrowed and taboo. (shrink)